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Abstract: This paper examines how racial violence underpins the European Union’s
border regime. Drawing on two case studies, in northern France and the Balkans, we
explore how border violence manifests in divergent ways: from the direct physical vio-
lence which is routine in Croatia, to more subtle forms of violence evident in the gover-
nance of migrants and refugees living informally in Calais, closer to Europe’s geopolitical
centre. The use of violence against people on the move sits uncomfortably with the lib-
eral, post-racial self-image of the European Union. Drawing upon the work of postcolo-
nial scholars and theories of violence, we argue that the various violent technologies
used by EU states against migrants embodies the inherent logics of liberal governance,
whilst also reproducing liberalism’s tendency to overlook its racial limitations. By interro-
gating how and why border violence manifests we draw critical attention to the racia-
lised ideologies within which it is predicated. This paper characterises the EU border
regime as a form of “liberal violence” that seeks to elide both its violent nature and its
racial underpinnings.
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Introduction and Methods
I have a question for you: If the European Union stands for liberty and equality and all
that, how can it be taken from us? They say they do so much humanitarian work, but
they don’t want even 2000 people from this camp? And they beat us, aggressively.
(Interview with Afghan victim of Croatian police violence, July 2019, Bihac, Bosnia-
Herzegovina)
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A Radical Journal
of Geography
This paper brings together evidence from two research projects on border vio-
lence in Europe—in northern France and the Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina
(henceforth Bosnia) border. Each of these case studies demonstrates that within
the European Union, violence is routinely used to control immigration. Between
these case studies, we see how European border violence is obscured by the con-
cealment and displacement of violence to spatial “peripheries” where they are less
likely to be detected. These empirical findings of border violence stand in stark
contrast with Europe and the European Union’s liberal, post-racial self-image,
which positions human dignity, human rights and the rule of law as fundamental
tenets of “European values” (European Union 2019). Rather than accepting this
hegemonic understanding of liberal bordering practices, we argue that the tech-
nologies of concealment and displacement evidenced within these case studies
amount to a form of “liberal violence”, marked by the obscuring of violent gover-
nance and the racial logics underpinning it.
The first of these case studies presents fieldwork conducted in France, ongoing
between 2015 and 2019, with the town of Calais providing a focal point. North-
ern France constitutes the north-western edge of the EU’s Schengen border zone,
and the port town of Calais is a transit-point out of the Schengen area to the UK.
Calais has seen significant numbers of migrants arrive and reside informally over
the last 20 years, en-route to the UK via the English Channel (see Rygiel 2011).
Research here began in 2015 when thousands of migrants who had been living
in informal settlements in the port-town were corralled into a space on the edge
of the town’s limits, a site which became the infamous “Calais jungle” (Mould
2017; Van Isacker 2019). Our research in Calais has involved Environmental
Health Surveys (see Dhesi et al. 2015, 2018) and ethnographic research alongside
volunteers and camp inhabitants, and has been used to explore the subtle and
everyday acts of state-enforced structural violence, through inaction and aban-
donment (see Davies et al. 2017).
The second case study presents research from Bosnia, ongoing between 2016
and 2019. The wider region known to the EU as “the Western Balkans” is one set-
ting to which EU border security has been “outsourced” (Trakilovic 2020) and is
thus a productive site through which to examine the contestation of Europe’s
exclusionary practices. Since the re-imposition of Dublin 3 border controls in
2016, migrants and refugees have become stranded on the borders between
Croatia inside the EU, and Serbia and Bosnia on its periphery (Umek et al. 2019).
Those migrants and refugees who have attempted to make journeys into Croatia
and Slovenia (i.e. into the EU), have routinely faced physical abuse from border
guards within EU territory. This violence, documented by activists (Border Vio-
lence Monitoring Network 2020), humanitarian organisations (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2019; MSF 2017), and our own long-term research, is more direct and
crude than that which affects migrants and refugees in Calais. It is characterised
by theft and physical assaults: fists and batons against flesh and bone. These
abuses are catalogued by border violence monitors with whom we are collaborat-
ing on a scholar-activist research project. Our data here consist of the long-term
observations of scholar-activist Karolına Augustova who has worked with grass-
roots volunteers in collating violence reports over an 11-month period between
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January 2018 and December 2018, and a month of qualitative fieldwork in Bosnia
by the other three authors, specifically focusing on assembling testimony about
experiences of violent and illegal pushbacks from the EU. The data are supple-
mented with observations and interviews from fieldwork in Serbia in 2019.
The contrast between these two modalities of violence at different external bor-
ders of the European Union (Figure 1) have prompted us to consider more closely
the function of border control within European liberal democracies. The European
border’s “integrity” is enforced through various forms of violence, both direct
and indirect, that can lead to wounding and death to those who try to enter
irregularly (Jeandesboz 2014). As critical migration scholars have shown, often the
more indirect and geographically “distant” forms of violence are the most lethal:
the removal of rescue ships in the Mediterranean for example, leaving thousands
to drown as they make perilous journeys to Europe (Stierl 2018). Whilst there
exists much insightful scholarship on the technologies of border governance (see
Jones 2016), which have answered vital questions about how irregular bodies are
immobilised and rendered precarious, there remains a critical need to also interro-
gate its foundational principles: its rationales, its logics. In other words, questions
of why these violent technologies of bordering are allowed and justified.
It is in this space that our paper makes its contribution. This paper looks at the
two aforementioned case studies of border violence used to securitise EU borders
and suggests that although such acts of violence differ in manifestation, they
Figure 1: Map of Europe showing case study locations. At the time of writing the UK
was still part of the EU. (Source: authors) [Colour figure can be viewed at wile
yonlinelibrary.com]
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share a dialectical unity. Each form of violence works to obscure its brutality, often
through concealment and displacement—and thus mask the racial logics which
underpin the EU’s border work. This obscuring of violence helps sustain notions
of European liberalism by camouflaging liberalism’s contradictions with respect
to race.
The paper begins by reviewing literature on violent migration governance in a
liberal age, making the distinction between violent governing technologies and its
rationales, using Galtung’s (1990) notion of “cultural violence”. Drawing on the
work of Goldberg (2002) in particular, it then examines the racial logics underly-
ing the modern European nation-state, by tracing the long-standing contradic-
tions between Europe’s self-avowed universal liberalism, and its spatial and
ideological limits. This postcolonial perspective is crucial to understanding how
the boundaries of Europe and European liberalism have been ideologically con-
structed (El Tayeb 2011; Losurdo 2011). We then examine the two case studies
described above, detailing the types of violent technologies used, but also exca-
vating the ways in which racialisation can be detected in that violence in subtle
and more overt ways. We conclude by framing contemporary Europe’s border
governance as a form of “liberal violence” that works to obscure its racial under-
pinnings.
Violence in Liberal Times
Whilst the notion of a “European” continent predates liberalism, contemporary
Europe and Western European values are largely accepted to be couched in liberal
ideology. Individual freedoms and rights to speech, expression, political organisa-
tion and movement, together with the architecture of democratic political states
are all considered hallmarks of liberal European society. Furthermore, liberal rights
are considered inherent and universal, rather than predicated upon inherited
traits, for instance of race or ethnicity (Parekh 1992). The nation-state itself with
its structured bureaucracy is designed to balance popular democratic will with
individual rights, and becomes the primary vehicle through which the liberal rule
of law is sustained. On the eve of the Iraq war, Habermas and Derrida (2003:295)
summarised in their overly optimistic call for European unity and peace: “Euro-
peans have rather a lot of faith in the organizational and governing capacities of
the state ... they possess a keen sense of the dialectic of enlightenment ... Their
level of tolerance towards violence against persons is comparatively low”. A senti-
mental equivalent of this notion is also evoked in the self-proclaimed values of the
EU’s border and coastguard agency Frontex, which is charged with the “protec-
tion” of liberal European states: “We are professional. We are respectful. We seek
cooperation. We are accountable. We care” (Frontex 2019).
As this paper will show, that notion of “caring” is very far from the reality of
policing the European border, which is unquestionably violent. But the words of
Habermas and Derrida (2003) on European society’s aversion to violence echoes
the orthodox tale of modern European states’ relationship to violent governance.
This tale sees European states as having overturned the autocratic sovereign
power of former European kingdoms and empires. It sees Europe—and its settler
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colonial offshoots—as having introduced universal rights and eventually, demo-
cratic accountability. Societal violence is then reduced, or at the very least made
“just” (Neu 2018), by being delivered through legal infrastructure that is pre-
mised on those liberal, democratic rights. This is one reason why violence is often
under-theorised, by accepting the notion that lingering acts of violence in liberal
settings are “mere collateral casualties produced along a steady path to enlight-
ened modernity” (Hutta 2019:65).
On the contrary, as geographers and allied scholars have demonstrated, vio-
lence is still very much part of liberal society (Neu 2018), and not merely an out-
come of unequal social relations (Galtung 1969), but also as a reflection of
society itself: its priorities, its anxieties, and its vulnerabilities (Davies 2019). In
other words, violence holds a “mimetic” relationship to the fundamental value
system of society (Springer and Le Billon 2016:1).
The work of Galtung (1969, 1990) is key to understanding the mechanisms
through which violence operates in liberal settings, highlighting how violence is
either hidden or legitimised. If liberal societies would like to see themselves as
peaceful and fair, then the presence of violence must be disguised, displaced or
rendered just. Galtung (1969, 1990) offers important insights into the ways in
which violence operates, from its socialisation and structuration, down to the
actual acts of violence themselves. For Galtung (1969) the very point at which
violence is inflicted on a body is not the most sociologically significant moment.
Instead, he positions structural and cultural violence as precursors and precondi-
tions to acts of direct violence, arguing that structural and cultural forces both
legitimise and embed violence into the routine patterns of everyday life (Galtung
1990). Both structural and cultural violence are marked by a reduced visibility
next to the very act of violence itself (Rodruiguez et al. 2014). For Galtung
(1990:294), structural violence constitutes the processes through which violence is
sustained, and this very much corresponds to the orders through which violence
may be concealed, displaced or denied.
Those documenting the structural violence of bordering practices have evidenced
some of the ways in which it can be shrouded, and these can vary in their levels of
subtlety (Davies et al. 2017; Jones 2016). The consequences of banning rescue mis-
sions in the Mediterranean (Garelli et al. 2018), or the illegalisation of providing
water for migrants in the Sonora desert both have deadly implications. Similarly, the
attempts to illegalise food distribution to asylum seekers which may keep them in
states of permanent hunger (Tazzioli 2019; Tyerman 2019); or “domicidal” prac-
tices such as the systematic soaking of belongings and the routine destruction of
improvised migrant shelters in Calais and elsewhere (Hagan 2019; Van Isacker
2019). Other techniques of bordering take place away from the physical borderzone
in institutional settings, where for example, healthcare for refugees can be denied or
limited, which can allow preventable illnesses to debilitate those who might suffer
from them (Dhesi et al. 2018; Ilcan et al. 2018). Within these examples, states can
use a legal or extra-legal architecture of public policy to enact harm through the vio-
lence of inaction and denial (Davies et al. 2017).
Migrant deaths can thus occur out of sight, displaced and concealed along des-
olate southern borderlands of Arizona or New Mexico, thousands of miles from
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policymakers in Washington DC, or beneath the waves of the Mediterranean Sea.
The suffering deliberately enacted through the subtle technologies above, also
allows such violence to appear self-afflicting, where the “violent conditions” that
refugees are forced to endure are framed as of their own making (Laurie and Shaw
2018). Just as governmentality subverts power to look and feel like the outcome
of individual free choice, so too does the politics of inaction and the withholding
of basic human rights re-centre blame to that of the migrant “Other”.
Unlike the direct and structural forms of violence discussed above, cultural vio-
lence takes us beyond technologies and processes of violence towards its underly-
ing rationales. Though post-structuralist writers may contend that processes of
violence and their logics are overlapping, for Galtung (1990:294) cultural violence
is the permanent substrata beneath which the process of structural violence, and
the event of direct violence takes place: the patterns of prejudice, repression and
exploitation that construct the very subjects to whom violence may then be
apportioned. Galtung (1990:296) specifically refers to ideologies such as national-
ism or religion as the basis upon which popular and political consent are often
drawn to normalise repressive violence. Here, by centring race in our analysis of
border violence, we begin to isolate the rationales of governance that can often
be drowned out by the mundane rhetoric of everyday politics, or overshadowed
by the blunt immediacy of violent acts themselves.
Europe and Race: Liberal Contradictions
Let us then return to the aforementioned liberal self-image of Europe and its
attendant values of universal liberty: values that provided an intellectual basis for
the democratic revolutions and evolutions of political orders in Europe between
the 17th and 20th centuries. Notions of “freedom” and “justice” capture the turn
away from autocratic sovereign rule towards a social contract which amplifies the
rights of domestic citizenry, or the supposed domination of Nature by Reason.
However, the cracks and contradictions of this self-image are apparent from the
very inception of European liberal thought. Morefield (2014:4) contends that it is
imperialism that “presents perhaps the ultimate challenge to the founding narra-
tives of liberal equality, individual freedom and sovereign authority”. This is
because the foundational tale of European liberalism readily excludes narratives of
women, non-freemen, and crucially, black and brown people who had been colo-
nised by ostensibly “liberal” states (Mehta 1999). This section explores how
echoes of this liberal contradiction, borne in the context of colonialism, is sus-
tained in the contemporary racial border logics of the European Union.
Goldberg (2002) throws the dominant narrative of liberalism into doubt with
his exegesis of liberal philosophy, by re-evaluating its tenets through the lens of
race and colonialism. Goldberg (2002) dissects essays by John Locke, Thomas Car-
lyle and even John Stuart Mill, whose liberalism scarcely extended to bestowing
equal rights to colonised subjects. At its most egregious, the works of Carlyle
manifests an explicit “negrophobia” (Goldberg 2002:58–60) justified through bio-
logical determinism. Even at its least inflammatory, the liberal racism of John Stu-
art Mill and others demarcate African, Eastern and Asian entities as insufficiently
6 Antipode
ª 2020 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
developed, socially or politically to be considered deserving of the liberal self-rule
that Europe was inherently thought to merit. This logic, as Parekh (1994) astutely
observed, allowed for distant colonies to be violently governed as though existing
in supposed Hobbesian “states of nature”—with little regard for the freedoms
under which Europeans had discovered themselves. This contradiction—a wilful
myopia—is also extended to the very construction of that other invention of the
enlightenment: the nation-state. The nation-state, bound as it is by geography,
serves to protect citizens from the supposed alternative “state of nature”. As Gold-
berg (2002:240) observes, it does so by mobilising the spatially bound configura-
tions of race, in order to comfort and control those within, and compel those
without. A violent “racial rule”, as Goldberg (2002) puts it, becomes a natural
extension of this rationality. We therefore come to expect liberal values and rights
to be lent and upheld in Europe—but no further.
This colonial “original sin” of European liberal states is significant because it
builds the racial configurations that become the raison d’e^tre of violent tech-
niques of border violence in contemporary European and settler colonial regimes.
Aime Cesaire (2001), among many others, referred to the centuries of European
rule of much of the colonised world as civilisational. As Cedric Robinson (1983:
xxxi) concludes on European domination in the colonial age, “Race was its episte-
mology, its ordering principles, its organising structure, its moral authority, its
economy of justice, commerce and power”.
Western colonial powers routinely used the notion of civilising processes as jus-
tification for imperial conquest (Fabiani 2011)—a racist ideology that was also
replicated within the discipline of geography. Colonialism did not merely reshape
the colonies but constructed the notions of “Western Civilisation”, as opposed to
non-Western barbarism. It is for this reason that Frantz Fanon (1961:53) famously
quipped, “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World”. The very definition
of Western civilisation and the liberalism it purports to exemplify is defined in rela-
tion to this uncivilised Other (Said 1978). And yet, as Cesaire (2001:32) empha-
sises, and as this paper will reiterate, it is the very dehumanisation of racialised
subjects in this way that allows for them to be violently, and illiberally treated.
The 20th century post-war order might ostensibly be seen to provide a post-
colonial break from what Goldberg (2002) described as “racial rule”, yet we see a
continuation of these debates today through European migration policy (El Tayeb
2008; Turner 2015). Even when the 1951 Refugee Convention was signed by lib-
eral nation-states in the wake of European civilian displacement after the second
world war, Britain and other colonial powers harnessed the technologies of
bureaucracy to restrict the right to asylum to non-Europeans (Mayblin 2017). Asy-
lum, in other words, was never designed for colonial subjects.
In contemporary settings we can see the distinctive echoes of imperialism in
the violations of rights of migrants and refugees (Walia 2013). Bhambra (2017)
notes that contrary to prevailing narratives of Europe as a refugee and asylum
destination, the reality is that Europe, as the wealthiest continent in the world,
hosts fewer refugees per population than any other (Bhambra 2017:396). Devel-
oping countries—not their former colonial masters—host 80% of the world’s refu-
gees (Bhambra 2017:396). In this century, EU countries including the United
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Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy and Hungry
have all seen a great deal of anxiety being expended over the place of immigrants
in those countries by mainstream political parties (Betz 2016). Moreover, the
European Union has presided over a migration regime which has eased restric-
tions to movement internally, only to strengthen the barriers to entry for those
from outside the EU. As El Tayeb (2011:2–3) explains, the construction of “for-
tress Europe” in this way is routinely bolstered by discourses that see Europe as a
beleaguered “vanguard” in an otherwise dangerous world. Similarly, on the eve
of European political expansion after the fall of the Berlin wall, Stuart Hall
(1991:18) explicitly identified how the emerging discourse around liberal Euro-
pean cosmopolitanism could easily pivot to countervailing discursive markers
around refugees, fundamentalism and “illegal migration”. It is this very logic that
M’charek et al. (2014) identify when detailing the ways in which the governance
of European borders hinges upon the technology of race and the processes of
racialisation.
As scholars routinely remind us, race is not to be essentialised, but considered a
shifting category (Gilroy 1987; Sivanandan 1990), driven by social, political and
cultural discourse and practice. We will see in the second case study in this paper,
how refugees racialised through their perceived Muslim-ness, have their Muslim
identity used as justification for violence. The unsettling “otherness” of migrants is
then bolstered through discursive frames that draw migrants as, for example, bar-
barians at the gates of civilisation (Todorov 2010), as too illiberal to find a place
in liberal society, as dirty (Zimring 2017), as disgusting, and even animalistic
(Vaughn-Williams 2015). Each of these tropes forms the cultural violence (Galtung
1990), which then allows harm to be perpetrated to the very bodies of migrants
and refugees who are racialised in this way. The racialisation of non-European
Others provides the ideological and epistemic base on which the structures of
anti-migrant oppression are built. We need to explicitly contextualise the violence
evident at the world’s borders—and in both case studies presented here—as racial
violence.
There are risks of not confronting the racial underpinnings of border violence.
De-racialised readings of migration governance upholds the near-mythical version
of European and settler colonial history which simply draws violence as aberra-
tions or policy-failure in otherwise egalitarian and progressive societies (Mondon
and Winter 2020). Such readings re-inscribe what Lentin (2008) describes as the
myth of a “post-racial Europe”, alongside its intellectual handmaiden which sim-
ply takes anti-migrant violence to be a technocratic result of the state’s governing
practices with respect to citizenship, rather than structural exclusions with respect
to race; a trope so often repeated within “migration studies”. As this literature
review has argued, this very elision reproduces the race-blind logics of liberal vio-
lence. Building on this literature review, in what remains of the paper we will
explore two interconnected case studies that demonstrate racial violence at the
European border. Drawing on long-term research in Calais and the Balkans, we
will show how “liberal violence” is a dominant form of EU border governance,
which operates through racialised logics and is sustained through the conceal-
ment, displacement and denial of racial violence.
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Violence against Refugees and Migrants in Calais
Gentlemen, we must speak more loudly and more honestly! We must say openly that
indeed the higher races have a right over the lower races. I repeat that superior races
have a right, because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilise inferior races.
(Jules Ferry, 28 March 1884)
Jules Ferry was a liberal statesman and two-time Prime Minister of France. As his
speech above suggests, he was also “one of the main theoreticians of the colonising
process” (Fabiani 2011:8) and an ardent white supremacist during the Third Repub-
lic (1870–1940). It is not without irony that some 130 years later, descendants of
the colonial subjects that Jules Ferry had lobbied to subjugate, would be stood in
line, waiting in the rain to charge their phones at a refugee shelter named “Le Cen-
tre Jules Ferry”, situated on the edge of the largest displacement camp in mainland
Europe, on the outskirts of Calais. Let us explore how this came to be the case.
For over 20 years, Calais in northern France has been a transit site for refugees
travelling to the UK to seek asylum. Throughout this period, the port town
became a reluctant host to thousands of displaced people, who lived—and con-
tinue to live—informally in numerous squats and disused sites on the town’s
periphery. In April 2015, the shifting population of refugees were corralled onto
one peripheral site: a former toxic dumping area alongside Le Centre Jules Ferry,
two miles from the streets of Calais, out of sight for the town’s residents and tour-
ists. At its peak, the site hosted up to 8000 residents, and was the only location
in Calais where displaced people were allowed to sleep and reside. Not since the
wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s had the continent witnessed the political
use of encampment on such a scale.
We posit that the designation of the Calais camp in 2015 was an act of both
concealing and displacing the racial violence of refugee governance. Furthermore,
we suggest this violence was made possible by the racialisation of the camp’s
inhabitants. Rather than working with the UK to allow asylum claims to be han-
dled either side of the English Channel, or to allow for processes of family reunifi-
cation, refugees had been abandoned by state agencies. Their right to family lives
and resettlement would not be innate, but dependent on making dangerous bor-
der crossings. However, their very presence in the centre of Calais was a problem
for authorities; their visibility in civic spaces was for them, egregious (Migration
Observatory 2014). Accordingly, in an act of concealed violence, the camp’s resi-
dents were deliberately fed only one meal per day from Le Centre Jules Ferry,
which only covered less than half of the camp’s population (Davies et al. 2017).
Many residents reported hunger; they also had no safe storage for food, which
led to gastrointestinal illnesses (Dhesi et al. 2015). Shelters consisted of donated
tents, or rudimentary tarpaulin over improvised wooden structures. During our
own fieldwork in Calais in April 2015, we noted the feeling of sudden rupture
and shock when walking from the suburban streets of Calais into the space of the
camp where the suffering of refugees was laid bare (Davies and Isakjee 2019). In
the early days of this new camp, merely a road and a hedgerow concealed from
view the living conditions of migrants, who would otherwise be living directly
alongside French citizens and residents of Calais.
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After French authorities had forcefully displaced refugees to the site of the new
camp in 2015, the so called “jungle” became a highly concentrated site of refu-
gees living informally—a space where “global racialized inequalities [were] sud-
denly writ large on the European landscape” (Davies and Isakjee 2019:215). The
displacement of refugees to this site however ultimately failed to hide the “prob-
lem” of migrants, the injustice of their habitation, or the inability of state violence
to act as a deterrent. From the smell of burning rubbish due to the lack of waste
collection, to the acrid taste of chemicals in the air from the adjacent industrial
park (Figure 2), the camp became a state-induced public health disaster. Indeed,
an environmental health survey of the camp conducted in 2015 provided a sys-
tematic account of the public health conditions in the camp, concluding that the
French government failed to meet basic humanitarian standards set out by the
UNHCR (see Dhesi et al. 2015, 2018). Simply put, abandoning the refugee popu-
lation to live in the so-called “jungle” without sufficient state provision was lead-
ing to extensive bodily harms. Together with a dearth of shower facilities, and
with no safe way to wash clothes or bedding, an estimated fifth of the camp’s
population contracted scabies. What’s more, there was an acute shortage of toi-
lets, which left refugees with no option but to defecate on open ground.
Of course, the French government and local prefecture did not ascribe a racial
motive to these acts of violence. Nor too, would the status of “violence” be
ascribed to the systematic denial of sanitation, water, and food to subaltern peo-
ple, the vast majority of whom originated from former European colonies, or “the
Figure 2: Two residents of the Calais “jungle” look out across the camp, with chemical
factories in the background. (Source: authors) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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colonial outside” (Goldberg 2006:332). Yet the spectre of race was apparent as a
logic under which these policies operated—from the camp’s creation to its even-
tual demolition in October 2016. As Galtung (1990:292) explained, cultural vio-
lence may sometimes operate “by making reality opaque, so that we do not see
the violent act or fact”. One such concealment is the way the creation of the
camp involved the discriminatory forcible eviction of refugees from more visible
parts of Calais. Concurrent with all forms of racialised policing, racial profiling was
key to this enforcement: during our fieldwork in 2016 we observed how refugees,
racialised and identified as unwelcome, would routinely be rounded up by patrol-
ling police, and transferred from central Calais back to the squalor of the camp—
back to the degrading conditions to which they would be deemed to belong.
As a result of this eviction and encampment of the so-called “jungle”, the racia-
lised divisions between migrant and citizen entered the realm of spectacle. The
camp became “a concentrated visible symbol of the ‘apartheid’ of migrant Others
from the Global South” (Davies et al. 2017:1268). Before long, the stark divide
between the condition of a majority-white Calaisian population, and the
encamped residents became perceptible, uncomfortable and even horrifying.
Within a week of the camp being established, we came across local farmers who
were offering photojournalists flights over the campscape for a small fee. Journal-
ists began to frequent the camp to write about the squalor and monetise the
unfolding scandal. For journalists the Calais camp was a “third-world slum” (Sini-
baldi 2015), a “shanty town” (Lichfield 2015) jutting out of an otherwise orderly,
“civilised” (Spence 2016) European scene. For geographers, it was “a slum of
London’s making” (Mould 2017), and the camp became politically intolerable
because it made the violent consequences of anti-migrant racism spatially concen-
trated, visible, and unmistakably there.
For this reason too, as the racial violence became apparent, solidarity organisa-
tions and charities began to protest, resist and deliver humanitarian supplies
(Mould 2017). One sign next to an improvised shelter on the edge of the camp
read, “2 B Black is not a crime” (Figure 3), and refugee residents themselves pro-
tested against the racism which made their violent treatment “acceptable”. The
concentration of racial othering turned the camp into an avatar of global inequal-
ity (Davies and Isakjee 2019). Scarcely since the second world war had such a dis-
tinct postcolonial spectre of racial difference been etched so unmistakably onto a
Western European landscape. Like the racialised trope of “gypsy camps” in Eur-
ope, the so-called “jungle” produced a “perfect juxtaposition of a racially con-
noted marginalized population with a secluded urban location, eventually
crystallizing racist perceptions” (Picker et al. 2015:742). As the camp became an
icon for racial exclusion, the uneasy covenant of liberal violence—which relies
upon the ability to conceal and displace violence—had failed: the camp had to
go. The bulldozers rolled over the smouldering camp in October 2016 and its
inhabitants were bussed to distant locations across France, allowing once more
for racial border violence to be displaced, concealed, and denied.
Today, the violent governance of the Calais border continues to be obscured, and
the racial logics that presuppose it remain camouflaged. As we write this paper,
around 1500 people still reside informally in Calais and Dunkirk in a shifting
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constellation of smaller camps. Le Centre Jules Ferry has been demolished, and the
so-called “jungle” is long-gone, but the politics of concealment and displacement
has arguably become more sophisticated. The violence against refugees today often
takes the form of “domicide” (Mould 2017; Van Isacker 2019), where police rou-
tinely demolish shelters, and soak sleeping bags in flooded ditches; state-sanctioned
cruelty rendered innocuous by its repetition (Obradovic-Wochnik 2018) (Figure 4).
It also takes the form of attempts by local authorities to outlaw the distribution of
food in public (Hagan 2019). In these acts—systemic, subtle, and often out of sight
—we see border violence continue, underpinned by the ever-present cultural vio-
lence of racism. Even within the politics of destitution and exhaustion, a racialised
hierarchy persists; during our fieldwork in 2019 we noticed how small groups of
homeless white people were permitted to sleep rough in the centre of Calais, while
black and brown homeless migrants would regularly be apprehended and evicted
from these same sites. Though the overt racial violence promoted by the likes of
Jules Ferry and his liberal peers may be gone, the racial logics that underpin the bor-
ders of Europe remain intransigent. This violence lives on in subtle and—as the next
section will demonstrate—not so subtle ways.
Violent “Pushbacks” at the Croatia–Bosnia Border
If the violence of the camp in Calais can be stealthy, along Croatia’s borders with
Bosnia and Serbia, a seemingly different violence operates, the hallmark of which
Figure 3: “2B Black is not a crime” written on a sign on the edge of the so-called Calais
“jungle”, 2015. (Source: authors) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonline
library.com]
12 Antipode
ª 2020 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
is open aggression and assault rather than insidious subtlety. Displaced people
attempting to pass through Croatia to seek asylum in the EU are routinely vio-
lently “pushed back” and illegally expelled into Bosnia and Serbia, without having
their asylum claims processed (Amnesty International 2019; European Council on
Refugees and Exiles 2019). As both the EU and the Schengen Area expands, the
countries on the EU’s external borders increasingly become responsible for this
border work. Whilst the Mediterranean Sea (Garelli et al. 2018) is “allowed” to
passively deter and even drown migrants journeying to Europe by boat, the
methods being used in Croatia take an active turn, and include direct, bodily vio-
lence. This empirical section compiles evidence of systematic physical assault on
migrants crossing into the EU through Croatia, with details of how that violence
is overt, at times explicitly racial in character, and often displaced to the EU bor-
derzone, with the southern and eastern borders of Croatia providing the back-
drop for this violent deterrence.
The “Balkan Route” or the “Western Balkan Route”—as described by Frontex
(El-Sharaawi and Razsa 2019)—came to prominence as immigration to Europe
peaked during 2015. Our fieldwork indicates that the Balkan Route was initially
an alternative to the more dangerous sea routes. Typically, refugees travelled from
Greece, through Serbia, and then either through Hungary into Austria and then
Germany, or through Croatia and Slovenia. Countries of the route themselves
experienced outward and forced migration, particularly during the 1990s
onwards, and this was felt acutely in Bosnia where the Muslim population was
Figure 4: A refugee shelter on the outskirts of Calais recently destroyed by French police
in a cyclical act of domicide. (Source: authors) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Liberal Violence and the Racial Borders of the EU 13
ª 2020 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
subjected to genocide perpetrated by Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces; as well as
forced displacement within the country and abroad. However, the relationship
between that displacement and the current migration through the region is com-
plex and, as Hromadzic (2019:128) highlights, contradictory: in Bosnia, for
instance, local populations both “embraced” the new migrants and “wished them
gone”; a point that resonated in our own fieldwork encounters.
More broadly, as Rexhepi (2018:2218) notes, the region came to be seen as a
“zone of vulnerability requiring constant surveillance”, which necessitated the
increased securitisation of borders at multiple geopolitical scales. Border security is
sometimes explicitly supported through racialised discourses and practices (see
e.g. Rexhepi 2018), as well as implicitly through the racialised segregation of refu-
gees into isolated and enclosed spaces (Bird et al. 2020). For example, the “clo-
sure” of the Hungarian border with barbed wire fences and increased violence—
the original exit point of the early iteration of the Balkan Route—was supported
by Viktor Orban’s narratives about “defending Christianity” from the “virus of ter-
rorism” and “mixed-race nations” (Fekete 2018). Each border closure along the
Balkan Route pushed, pulled and diverted displaced people around the region in
circulatory movements into increasingly precarious border crossings (Stojic
Mitrovic and Vilenica 2019). When apprehended in Croatia and Slovenia,
migrants are often expelled back to Bosnia in what has come to be termed as a
“pushback”.
The pushbacks and the associated violence are so endemic that during field-
work we recorded that on any given day, even a short walk in the small border
town of Velika Kladusa would result in encounters with groups of migrants who
would have been pushed back on that very day, mostly violently. When working
with the activist group No Name Kitchen to provide showers and clothes for
migrants living in informal squats, the sight of migrants with bruises, wounds or
bandages from border violence in Croatia was an everyday sight. The effects of
border violence are not just visible in the surrounding border towns; aid workers
and volunteers reported seeing injured survivors of pushbacks as far away as the
Eastern Bosnian town of Tuzla, and the Serbian capital Belgrade after they were
forced to turn backwards on their journeys.
Violence and racism are key features of the pushbacks away from the EU, as
practiced, particularly by Croatian border forces (Border Violence Monitoring Net-
work 2020). Author Karolına Augustova has worked as part of a border violence
monitoring network in the area to collect evidence of the violent and systematic
nature of these expulsions. Since January 2018, 680 testimonies of violent push-
backs have been reported, based on detailed interviews with victims, by only a
handful of activists working principally in Western Bosnia and Serbia (Border Vio-
lence Monitoring Network 2020). Of these, 270 involved the forced removal of
minors. However, the number of people being pushed back are likely far higher
than the number of cases that can be collated by the small numbers of volunteers
working in the region. Our fieldwork conducted in a camp and informal settle-
ments in Western Bosnia which receive refugees returning from pushbacks, as well
as interviews with border violence monitors, indicates that between 50 and 200
people are forcefully removed from Croatia and pushed back into Bosnia each day
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during the summer months, without having asylum claims processed. Those being
pushed back routinely return with visible physical injuries, and those subsequently
interviewed reported being subject to an array of violent abuses whilst detained in
Croatia.
It is important to detail some of the typical types of violence that asylum seek-
ers have reported, specifically when being expelled from Croatia. Almost univer-
sally, migrants and refugees have mobile phones confiscated and destroyed,
which are crucial for both navigation and contact with family members and
smugglers. With visibly smashed mobile phones quickly becoming evidence of
violent pushbacks (Figure 5), refugees showed us how their phones were being
destroyed in less obvious ways—with Croatian police destroying the circuitry
inside the phone, thereby concealing the criminal damage. Interviews with refu-
gees and border violence monitors indicated that other possessions including
money are also routinely taken by Croatian authorities, being a hallmark of this
type of violence.
In contrast with the situation in northern France, hundreds of cases of physical
beatings have been recorded in various forms: refugees commonly report being
assaulted with punches, kicks or being beaten with batons by Croatian border
agents, as well as electric tasers. For instance, a report made of an incident on 7
August 2019 recorded in Croatia near the Bosnian border at Maljevac, details
how 23 persons between the ages of 25 and 32 were beaten with batons and
fists, as well as being kicked. On 5 August 2019, a group of ten individuals aged
Figure 5: When returning from pushbacks, victims would often show us their phones,
which are routinely smashed by police before they are expelled back to Bosnia.
(Source: authors) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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18–45 from Afghanistan were similarly beaten with hands and batons. From the
extensively detailed testimony in this case is the following excerpt:
They beat us one by one and then they told us to go to Bosnia. There was a river to
cross to enter Bosnia. So each of us crossed the river after being beaten up. Some
people got beaten up hard, some people got beaten up less. Me, the last one, they
beat a lot. The first and the last ones get beaten up the most. One grabbed my shirt
and another one punched me ... I couldn’t protect my face. I told them: “Stop!
You’re hurting me. I cannot breathe.” He grabbed me ... and kicked my face two
times. (Interview conducted by Karolına Augustova, 5 August 2019; extracts published
by Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020)
The systematic violence meted out to people crossing the borders into Croatia is
corroborated too by reports from international aid organisations and NGOs
(Amnesty International 2019; MSF 2017). For example, NGOs and aid organisa-
tions have reported the use of violence including electric shocks, beatings and
sexual violence (Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020), as well as the use of
razors, knives, and food depravation (MSF 2017). During fieldwork in 2019, we
frequently met refugees with serious cuts, bruises and bandaged limbs which had
resulted from violent pushbacks. In addition to the systematic recording of border
violence, our research team spoke to over 50 migrants who had been stripped
and returned from Croatia to Bosnia with little clothing, and with shoes confis-
cated, so that the long walks back to camps inside Bosnia would result in severe
injuries to their feet. As in Calais, there is a concealment of this violence, notably
in the fact that the physical beatings take place under the cover of night and
often far from populated areas, amidst the forested hills and mountains along
Croatia’s border with Bosnia.
It is important to stress that the racial nature of border violence cannot be con-
tingent on the explicit avowals on behalf of the oppressor. However, in the vio-
lence reports and in our interviews with participants, a number of people testified
to how race was explicitly evoked during their violent pushbacks. A report on 21
September 2018, for example, describes how a refugee from Afghanistan was
beaten once he confirmed that he was Muslim:
[the Croatian border police] started beating us ... I said why do you do that because
this place is Europe ... The police officer said to me that I am an animal. He used the
electricity and also baton. (Interview conducted by Karolına Augustova, 21 September
2018; extracts published by Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020)
As Vaughn-Williams (2015:2) noted, the “animalisation” alluded to here, struc-
tures both “irregular” migrants’ testimonies and is also revealing of the racialised
nature of the abuses migrants suffer. Similarly, a report on 1 October 2018
described how a border official who administered physical violence made refer-
ence to Muslims killing the official’s father during the Yugoslav wars as justifica-
tion for not helping the refugee, and before beating them (Interview conducted
by Karolına Augustova, 1 October 2015; extracts published by Border Violence
Monitoring Network 2020). A report of a pushback in Slovenia from 5 August
2018 describes a Muslim woman having her headscarf refused and being told
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“This is the last time you [will wear] your scarf ... here is not Afghanistan, here is
Slovenia, here is no Islam” (Interview conducted by Karolına Augustova, 5 August
2018; extracts published by Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020).
The racialising of Muslim migrants as unwanted “Others” within a white Europe
(Fekete 2018; Rexhepi 2018) is explicit in these testimonies—but as with Calais,
the racial violence is elided, and obscured through both displacement and denial.
It would be inaccurate to see this violence as grounded in some form of perceived
“Balkan exceptionalism and the perceived “criminality” of the region and the
“Balkan Route” (El-Sharaawi and Razsa 2019), outside the sphere of “liberal
Europe”.
Neu (2018:22) writes about the violence of “unexamined liberalism” and urges
analysis to go beyond the atomised acts of violence, to understand instead the
construction of violence through the spatial decision-making and policy networks.
In order to make sense of this racial border violence, it is therefore vital to com-
prehend the wider geopolitical context. The proliferation of violent pushbacks can
be directly linked to Croatia’s aspirations for Schengen membership. For instance,
a fact-finding report by the Council of Europe has linked the heightened focus on
border security and strengthening as part of “preparations to access the border-
free Schengen area” (Council of Europe 2019:3; also European Council on Refu-
gees and Exiles 2019). According to whistle-blower reports, violence against
migrants at the border is systematic and institutionalised (Ombudswoman for
Human Rights 2019). As such, countries including Germany, France and Italy are
“protected” from the very presence of racialised outsiders; whilst Croatia is “re-
warded” with Schengen Accession (Human Rights Watch 2019).
Our interviews with EU Commission and Frontex staff also indicate that there is
widespread awareness of Croatian border violence—and so too its political role in
supporting Schengen Area expansion. Moreover, Croatia has repeatedly been
praised by EU officials specifically for its handling of “migration issues” (Vladisavl-
jevic 2018). In 2018, German chancellor Angela Merkel delivered public praise for
its border governance, claiming Croatia was doing “an outstanding job with its
security forces” (Merkel 2018). As M’charek et al. (2014) have evidenced, racial
bordering practices of the European Union are enmeshed in and depend upon an
array of security and technological infrastructure. The EU has provided crucial
funding and support to the bordering operations along this borderzone (Euro-
pean Commission 2018a): 108 million Euros has been spent on border manage-
ment in Croatia since 2014, with an additional 23.3 million Euros on emergency
border security infrastructure since 2016, and a further 6.2 million euros in 2019
(Council of Europe 2019:26). Since 18 July 2018, Frontex has been using air-
planes and visual data to stream to the over 1000-strong Croatian border police,
to assist them with “interception operations” (Council of Europe 2019:34). Fur-
thermore, the European Commission (2018b) has reported that technologies
including watchtowers, thermal vision cameras, drones, helicopters, and barbed
wire acquired through EU funds have been used in these operations to secure the
Bosnia–Croatia border. Just as the EU has been shown to outsource border secu-
rity to countries outside the union (Bialasiewicz 2012; Borg 2014), as countries
join the EU and prepare to join the Schengen zone, they too become
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responsibilised for the EU’s border security. In short, brutal physical violence is pe-
ripheralised to the EU’s external borders.
There is much scope for further focused exploration of the array of financial,
technological, institutional and infrastructural architecture that allows for violence
to take place against migrants in Croatia and in former Yugoslav space. However,
we return to the overarching point drawn from the empirical data; evidence
clearly shows that EU policies support border violence through funding of material
border security, and EU bodies to date have largely evaded confronting its exis-
tence, let alone its illegality. The acts of distancing the violence from Northern
Europe and centres of power in Brussels, Berlin and Paris allow for a level of plau-
sible deniability, or as Doty (2011) describes it, the space of moral “alibi”, away
from centres of geopolitical power, whose resources are crucial to maintaining
the profound racial violence evidenced in this section.
Liberal Violence and the Racial Border
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected, protected and constitutes the real
basis of fundamental rights. (European Union 2019)
European border policies routinely deliver violence to racialised migrant groups, in
abdication of both the liberal values and legal rights that the EU purports to
uphold. This ethical and legal failure is no aberration, but is systemic to European
border governance, as exemplified in this paper. At first glance, the racial violence
of EU bordering is hard to detect—border violence is routinely displaced, con-
cealed or denied where possible. In France on the north-western edge of the
Schengen Area, the obscuring of violence takes on more subtle forms; those seek-
ing asylum have restricted rights to even the basics of food, shelter and security
through the pernicious violence of inaction (Davies et al. 2017). Yet border policy
on the south-eastern edge of the Schengen Area features much more direct vio-
lence: systematic beatings of racialised migrants that seem more akin to the tor-
ture and corporal punishment of a pre-liberal age of governance.
We contend however that it is useful to conceive of both these different types
of violence in our contrasting case studies as forms of liberal violence. Liberal vio-
lence involves the structural obscuring of violence as is de rigueur in liberal soci-
eties—but also reproduces race-blind logics, which have long been part of
liberalism’s own history (Losurdo 2011; Morefield 2009). The manifestation of lib-
eral violence ostensibly contradicts the liberal values with respect to human rights,
dignity, and asylum in the case of this paper, but this contradiction is sustained
through the concealment of and displacement of violence. Liberal violence can
also be obscured through other mechanisms—as Neu (2018) wrote of “just liberal
violence”, liberal violence is often conceived of as being part of a humanitarian
project in and of itself.
The literature review demonstrated how European liberal thought has routinely
been guilty of deep inconsistency in relation to applying liberal rights to racialised
groups, an inconsistency which finds its roots in European colonialism, and can
also be witnessed across other settler colonial spaces. In these postcolonial times,
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that inconsistency has metamorphosed into violence directed at migrants as racia-
lised outsiders to whom, as the empirics show, the theoretical rights to asylum
and freedom from physical harm can be withheld—and so too grossly violated—
by the very states who espouse to uphold them. European and settler colonial
states can articulate their liberalism as a political mechanism with which to put
aside their colonial past and overlook their postcolonial present—but it simultane-
ously re-inscribes racial divisions through restrictive refugee and immigration poli-
cies and violent bordering practices. Crucially, the concealment and displacement
of racial violence towards migrants does political work in maintaining the facade
of European liberalism over its compromised edifice.
Scholars of race and post-colonialism rightly ask us to consider how the racial
logics underscoring racial violence are constructed, and similarly we must also
uncover the ways in which that very racial violence is obscured. The multiple
forms of social resistance, activism, and advocacy for migrant rights (Stierl 2018)
and against racial violence in Europe suggest the potential to challenge what
Losurdo (2011:344) described as liberalisms’ exclusionary clauses. However, the
strength of these resistances is at least partly dependent on the visibility of those
injustices and their racial components. By eliding the violent and racial nature of
EU border governance, liberal violence is allowed to continue undisturbed, easing
itself into a position of social embeddedness. We can find liberal violence else-
where too: mediated in the vast distance between the controllers of military
drones in the US, and its victims in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Singh 2017); or
within the toxic geographies of industrial sacrifice zones, where petrochemical
companies are permitted to expose racialised communities to the liberal violence
of pollution (Davies 2019). Liberal violence unleashes severe racial repression to
indefinitely detained denizens on Nauru Island, or in the sweatshops and work-
houses of the “global South” (Neu 2018) which create products cheaply for
wealthy consumers, to whom the reality of that labour—and the racialisation of
capital—is conveniently out of sight.
Within much migration scholarship on the so-called “European refugee crisis”,
the analysis of race and racism has remained curiously absent. At times this is a
function of the fact that liberal society makes a virtue of its liberal image, which is
why even contemporary racist practices often come pre-packaged with the epi-
taph “I’m not racist but” (Augoustinos and Every 2007). At other times this omis-
sion is accompanied by the under-theorised notion that “citizenship” rather than
“race” is the target of discriminatory practice; as if, somehow, the historical work-
ings of citizenship, biopolitics and borders have remained hermetically sealed
from the systemic and epochal racism that has touched everything else. Occasion-
ally, there is an implicit understanding amongst scholars that race plays a key role
in the governance of migration. However, without explicit recourse to this notion
there are pitfalls for scholars of migration. In simply unpicking the mechanics,
techniques, and modalities of violent governance alone, there is a danger of miss-
ing the structural forces of race, racism and racialisation that shape border gover-
nance and border imperialism. Without an analysis that considers race centrally,
the various technologies of violence may appear to be an almost unintentional,
spontaneous, unpredictable result of shifts in the modes of liberal governance; an
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innocent side effect of advanced liberal bureaucracies, governmentalities, and
technologies of bordering. The racial violence of the border outlined in this paper
is no eccentricity or mistake, it is the foundation upon which border regimes are
built.
We close this paper by re-affirming the importance of acknowledging the role
of race and racialisation in all forms of border violence and paying attention to
the ways that the racial violence of the state is routinely obscured. By calling this
violence “liberal” we hope to focus the lens of critique back within liberal societies
as a systemic issue, rather than as an aberration. Moreover, by considering these
acts as forms of liberal violence, we foreground how the obscuring of violence
against migrants, through concealment, displacement—or even denial or igno-
rance—helps sustain the pleasant and uncritical notions of “liberal Europe” and its
civilisational pretentions, against which the uncivilised Other is drawn, and then
violated, in Europe’s supposed defence.
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